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Abstract:  
We present an experimental study to learn about behavior in bargaining situations 
under large risks. In order to implement realistic risks involved in the field, we 
calibrate the experimental parameters from an environment involving substantial 
variation in profits, the motion picture industry. The leading example is the production 
of a movie that may give rise to a sequel, so actors and producers negotiate 
sequentially. We analyze the data in light of alternative behavioral approaches to 
understanding bargaining behavior under large risk. 
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1 Introduction
The study of ultimatum bargaining in laboratory experiments suggest that individ-
uals may be concerned with more than their own profit in evaluating the final out-
come of bargaining. Notions of fairness seem to play an important role and equal
sharing of the surplus has been shown to be the predominant outcome in many
studies investigating behavior in ultimatum bargaining experiments.1
In most of those studies the surplus to share between bargaining parties is cer-
tain. This is not very often the case in real life, where various gains from interac-
tion might be possible and only their probability rather than the actual realization
of the surplus is known to negotiation partners. Sometimes, uncertainty dissolves
only after contracts have been specified. Risks involved can be rather substantial
and might have an important impact on the behavior of bargaining parties. It is
not clear to which extent regularities observed in standard ultimatum bargaining
experiments hold under large risk. In this study, we want to shed light on how
negotiations develop in the presence of large risks.
In order to study risk of realistic magnitude, we calibrate the experimental pa-
rameters based on empirical observations from an environment involving substan-
tial variation in profits, the motion picture industry.2 Parameters are determined so
as to match the moments of an empirical distribution.3 The model developed in this
study relates to the structure of the bargaining process in this industry. We present
such situations by a two-stage ultimatum bargaining game in which the first period
surplus is stochastic. Only in case of a successful outcome at the first stage, i.e., that
an agreement is reached and a particular surplus realized, a “sequel project” with
a sure outcome can be negotiated with alternation of roles. Such repeated bargain-
1Starting with Gu¨th, Schmittberger Schwarze (1982) there is a large literature on ultimatum bar-
gaining experiments. Gu¨th and Tietz (1990), Roth (1995) and Camerer (2003) provide excellent sur-
veys.
2De Vany and Walls (2002) note that “Motion pictures are among the riskiest of products; each
movie is a ‘one-off’ innovation with highly unpredictable revenues and profits.”
3Our calibrations and the data for our study are based on a case study (Teichner and Luehrmann,
1992) that contains data on 99 movies in the 1989-season and some additional data on the profitability
of sequels, based on 60 sequels produced between 1970 and 1990. Teichner and Luehrmann base their
data on Variety Magazine and some other industry sources.
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ing differs from sequential bargaining models in so far, that the second stage is only
reached in case of previous agreement, an additional stochastic termination rule and
that the surplus is additive.4 The model structure therefore resembles risky partner-
ships and cooperations typical also for R&D joint ventures and venture capital.5
Related literature has studied asymmetric information in ultimatum bargaining.
Introducing risk or uncertainty about the size of the surplus for the responder has
been used to investigate strategic behavior of proposers in ultimatum bargaining
games. Results from those studies indicate that notions of fairness appear to re-
spond to strategic considerations. Since responders were deprived of the possibility
to compare relative outcomes of proposed allocations and punish selfish offers, pro-
posers took advantage of such situation and offered less or demanded more than
observed in comparable experiments with symmetric information.6
The main differences of the current study to this literature is that in our study
the surplus is extremely stochastic, i.e., involving large stakes and losses, and that
there is no private information. Further, we feel that results may not be completely
independent of the parameters chosen in the experiment. Choosing parameters that
closely resemble those in the field, might illuminate better what happens in risky
environments. Surprisingly, calibration of parameters is rarely used in experiments,
although we consider it another way to overcome the parallelism problem of the lab
and the field.7
4For experimental sequential bargaining studies see Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton (1985), Gu¨th
and Tietz (1990), and Ochs and Roth (1989).
5Venture capital firms finance their portfolio firms in stages. At each stage, the venture capitalist
either negotiates another round of financing or refuses further financing and terminates the relation-
ship (Gompers, 1995).
6Results are reported in Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993), Straub and Murnighan (1995) and Rapoport
and Sundali (1996), who study “offer games” in which the distribution of the stochastic surplus is
common knowledge but its realization is private information of the proposer, who offers an amount
to the responder. Kagel, Kim and Moser (1996) observe similar strategic behavior of proposers when
exchange rates, which are private information and differ between proposer and responder, are re-
vealed to the proposer only. Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993) and Rapoport, Sundali and Seale (1996)
study additionally “demand games” in which the distribution of the stochastic surplus is common
knowledge but its realization is private information of the proposer, who demands an amount from
the (to the responder unknown) realized surplus from the responder.
7There exist a few studies (Grether and Plott, 1984, and Hong and Plott, 1982), in which experi-
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We can summarize our results as follows. Firstly, responders rarely accept offers
below their first-stage opportunity costs. This could be due to the enormous and for
experimental studies quite unusual risk subjects face: in our calibrated parametriza-
tion the probability of being able to bargain for a lucrative sequel-contract at the
second stage is only 25%, so the potential reward is too risky to make subjects pay
for this opportunity by foregoing a certain outside option. Thereby proposers either
have to become the only risk taker or have no joint project at all. On the other hand,
there seems to be little reciprocation by responders who become proposers at the
second stage. They hardly offer more than the outside option, keeping 3/4 of the
sure second stage surplus for themselves. Interestingly, such self-serving behavior is
widely accepted by second stage responders, a result quite different from standard
ultimatum bargaining experiments.
We proceed as follows. In section 2, we introduce the model. Section 3 explains
the procedure we followed for calibrating the parameters of the model. Details of
the experimental design are described in section 4. Section 5 reports general re-
sults of the experimentally observed behavior. Section 6 is devoted to developing
two behavioral approaches, one based on outcome maximization and an alternative
approach based on equity concerns, both of which are confronted with the data in
section 7. Section 8 resumes.
2 The Model
We analyze the bargaining between a producer of a movie, denoted by P, and an
actor, denoted by A. Movie production is characterized by substantial risks: either
the movie is a hit, in which case the producer’s payoff is very large, or the movie
is a flop. Then profits are small and often negative. In many cases, producers try
to rehire core actors of top-grossing movies to produce a sequel. Producers seem
to think that rehiring the main actors of the original is critical to the success of a
sequel (in case of “When Harry met Sally,” Meg Ryan and Billy Crystal, in case of
mental parameters have been chosen to resemble those in the field.
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“Rocky,” Sylvester Stallone).8 Clearly, the bargaining power of the actor is high
when negotiating the contract for the sequel.9 Core actors of successful films know
they are indispensable for the sequel, giving them effective monopoly power.
We present such situations by a two-stage bargaining game where “studios”
have ultimatum power when casting the first film. Only if the original film has
been successful, actors negotiate a second contract. Actors, now indispensable to
the success of a movie the sequel, make a take it or leave it offer to the studio. The
game starts with the producer making a wage offer W1 to the actor. If the actor
rejects the proposed wage, the game ends with the actor receiving his rather low
outside option OA1 and the producer the profit O
P
1 which could be interpreted as the
gain from producing the film with another (presumably less talented) actor.
If the actor accepts the wage offer W1, the movie is produced. Then chance de-
termines the success s of the movie, where s ∈ { f , h}. The surplus generated by
the movie, to be divided between both bargaining parties, is denoted by Cs1. With
probability ω the movie is a “hit” (denoted by h) and generates a total surplus Ch1 ,
otherwise the movie is a “flop,” denoted by f and generates only C f1 < C
h
1 , where
0 < ω < 1. The profit of the producer is given by Πs1 = C
s
1 −W1.10
After a “flop” the game ends with the actor earning his wage W1 and the pro-
ducer the low profit Π f1 of a “flop.” After a “hit” the game proceeds to the second
stage. Then the actor proposes a contract for the sequel project. The gain from pro-
8A notable exception are the James Bond-movies that led to a remarkable number of sequels,
albeit with constant blocks of different actors.
9It is common for actors to sign profit sharing contracts. For those contracts, a contrast is often
drawn between actors who have little bargaining power and sign contracts over “net-profit” shares
and big stars -such as Tom Hanks- who are able to sign for shares of the “gross-profit” (Weinstein,
1998).
10Note that we do not allow for output-contingent contracts. Chisholm (1997) provides an em-
pirical analysis of profit sharing vs. fixed pay contract choice in the motion picture industry. Her
findings suggest that actor share contracts may be offered when the marginal impact of additional
effort on the commercial success of the film is expected to be significant. However, we do not model
effort-incentives, so the usual reasons for output-related pay do not apply. See Holstro¨m (1979) and
Grossman and Hart (1983) for the traditional argument for output-contingent contracts. See Gu¨th
and Maug (2002) for an example of a principal-agent model with effort-incentives where pay is fixed.
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ducing the sequel is known to be C2.11 The actor proposes a wage W2 that leaves the
producer with profits Π2 = C2 −W2. The reversal of bargaining power to the agent
captures that in case of a “hit” the formerly unknown actor is now a movie star and
cannot easily be replaced. Accordingly, his outside option OA2 could be larger than
before what we, however, do not impose since there are no data allowing to estimate
the possibly positive difference OA2 −OA1 .
If the producer rejects the actor’s contract offer, the game ends and the actor
receives his outside option OA2 in addition to his previous payoff W1 whereas the
producer does not produce the sequel and earns the outside option OP2 in addition
to his previous earnings Πh1. If the producer accepts, then both players collect their
contractual earnings from both movies. The extensive form of the game is therefore:
1. P offers a wage-contract to A that specifies a fixed wage W1 for A and splits
the uncertain gain from producing the original movie.
2. A can accept or reject. If A rejects, both parties receive their outside payoff
and the game ends. If A accepts, the original movie is produced and the game
continues.
3. Nature determines the success state s of the movie. Both parties receive a
payoff dependent on the success of the movie according to their contract. If
the movie is a flop, the game ends. If the movie is a hit, the game continues.
4. A offers P a contract that specifies a fixed wage for A and a fixed profit for P
for producing a sequel to the original movie.
5. P can accept or reject this contract. If P rejects, both parties receive an addi-
tional payoff dependent on their outside opportunities and the game ends. If
P accepts, the sequel is produced with gains from production C2 that are split
according to the contract and the game ends.
11Sequels are a much safer bet. Evidence comes from the case study (Teichner and Luehrmann,
1992) we base our calibration on as well as from Prag and Casavant (1994), who find a positive
relation between a film’s revenue and the film being a sequel.
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3 Calibrating Parameters
We will determine the parameters of the model so as to match the moments of an
empirical distribution. In the following we present the empirical data of movie pro-
duction and discuss the calibration. From industry data we determine most param-
eters of the model through calibration. The data for calibration are found in the case
“Arundel Partners - The Sequel Project” (Teichner and Luehrmann, 1992). The case
assembles data for 99 movies produced by 6 major studios released in the United
States in 1989. The data in this case study are taken from a database largely based
on Variety Magazine, a trade magazine specializing on the movie industry. Based
on Exhibit 7 of the case we calculate the net present value (NPV) of a first film as:12
NPV =
PV o f Net In f lows at year 1
1.12
− PV o f Negative Cost at year 0. (1)
Here, the present value of net inflows are gross box office proceeds in the US, plus
international proceeds and revenues from video rentals net of distribution costs and
expenses. These are discounted at an estimated cost of capital of 12%. Negative
costs include all costs required to make the negative of the film of which prints can
be made and rented to theaters. Negative costs include among others the salaries
of actors and director, production management, special effects, lighting, and music.
Table 1 gives the total number of films per studio, the number of films that generated
a positive NPV on the initial investment, and the total net present value over all 99
films for six major Hollywood studios.
Hence, the average value of a first film is $736.6m/99=$7.44m, and 42 films are
profitable with the median film making a loss of $2.26m. The standard deviation
is $34.16m, showing that movie-production is risky. Also, the risks and payoffs
are distributed somewhat unevenly across studios with MCA being by far the most
profitable and Sony being the least profitable, making losses on 26 of their 34 films
in 1989. The most profitable film in the sample is Batman (Warner Brothers, NPV=
$224.33m), the greatest disaster was The Adventures of Baron Munchhausen (Sony,
NPV= −$45.54m).
The case study estimates the value of potential sequels. On average, costs of se-
12The discount rate of 12% is suggested by the case writers.
7
Studio Number of films Positive NPV Films Total NPV
MCA Universal 14 11 $263.7
Paramount 10 5 $25.7
Sony 34 8 −$55.4
20th Century Fox 11 5 $23.2
Warner Brothers 19 7 $233.1
Disney 11 6 $246.2
Total 99 42 $736.6
Table 1: Profitability of first films
Parameter Symbol Value
Probability of hit ω 0.25
Pie in case of a hit Ch1 68
Pie in case of a flop C f1 −10
Pie in case of the sequel C2 33
Outside option actor OA1 = O
A
2 2
Outside option producer OP1 = O
P
2 7
Table 2: Experimental parameters
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quels are 120% of the costs of a first film, according to our model largely due to a
change in bargaining power resulting in higher wages after a successful first film.
Box office proceeds are on average 70% of the first film, and not every successful
film in the sense of a large positive NPV leads to a potentially profitable sequel.
Hence, on average sequels are less profitable than first (success) films. There are
exceptions: Batman 2 was more successful than the original movie! Based on the
calibration documented in appendix A we choose the parameters listed in table 2.13
Effectively, we chose the model parameters so as to match the main features of the
joint distribution of film values and sequel values (e. g., mean and standard devia-
tion, ratio of sequel value to value of first film).
4 Experimental Design and Procedure
Our experimental design exactly matches the sequential game. In order to analyze
bargaining behavior we rely on the estimated parameters from the case study. The
computerized experiment was conducted at the laboratory of Humboldt University
Berlin in November and December 2001. The computer program was developed
using the software z-tree (Fischbacher, 1999). 72 Participants –mainly students of
business administration, economics and information technology– were recruited via
E-mail and telephone. We conducted six sessions, each consisting of two matching
groups. To allow for learning, participants interacted for 18 rounds in the two-stage
bargaining game. Participants first read the instructions and were then privately
informed about their role.14 Roles were neutrally framed as “participant A” and
“participant B” for the role of the actor and producer, respectively. In the follow-
ing, we continue to refer to participants as “actors” and “producers,” although the
experimental subjects were not aware of this interpretation. Participants remained
either an actor or producer throughout the whole experiment. One matching group
consisted of three negotiation groups each with one actor and one producer. After
13The full calibration results for the parameters are listed in table 9 in appendix A.
14See appendix D for a shortened and translated version of the instructions.
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every round new actor-producer-pairs were formed randomly.15
Information feedback was as follows: After the first bargaining stage partici-
pants were told whether the actor had accepted the producer’s offer. If the offer was
accepted, they were informed about the randomly selected pie size and their first
stage earnings. After the second stage participants were told whether the producer
had accepted the actor’s offer and what they have earned in the second stage. At
the end of each interaction participants were additionally informed about their own
cumulative payoffs.
A session lasted on average 140 minutes. The exchange rate was DM 2 for one
experimental currency unit (ECU).16 Participants were paid their average payoff of
all 18 rounds which was on average DM 21. More precisely, producers received
on average DM 25 with a minimum payment of DM 1 and a maximum of DM 71.
Actors earned on average DM 17 with minimum payments of DM 8 and maximum
of DM 26. Additionally, participants were paid an initial endowment of DM 10 and
DM 5 for completely answering the post experimental questionnaire.
5 Data: First and Second Stage Offers
At the first stage which involved negotiations about the stochastic joint profit of
either −10 (flop) or 68 (hit), we observe in total 648 W1-offers. Table 3 and Figures
1 and 2 report medians, means, and standard deviations as well as histograms of
offers, acceptances and rejections on both stages.
At stage one the producer offered on average 0.8 to the actor. In 435 cases actors
accepted the offer with a mean of 4.5. Then chance decided for 143 producer-actor-
pairs that a “hit” was realized and subjects continued at the second stage. At the
second stage parties negotiated about a joint profit of 33. The average amount ac-
tors offer to the producer, Π2, is close to the producer’s outside option of 7 with
a median Π2-offer of 8 and 47% of all second stage offers were either 7 or 8. Π2-
15Rematching was restricted to matching groups. Participants were not informed about the restric-
tion of rematching within matching groups what should have further discouraged repeated-game
effects.
16DM 1 ≈ EUR 0.51.
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Stage 1 offer (W1)
Nobs Median Mean Std.dev
All 648 3.0 0.8 6.8
Accepted 435 3.0 4.5 4.1
Not accepted 213 −10.0 −6.6 4.8
Stage 2 offer (Π2)
Nobs Median Mean Std.dev
All 143 8.0 8.9 2.9
Accepted 121 8.0 9.3 2.3
Not accepted 22 8.0 6.6 4.4
Table 3: Offers: number of observations, median, mean, and standard deviation
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Figure 2: Frequencies and acceptance/rejection of stage 2 o¤ers (N=143).
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Figure 2: Frequencies and acceptance/rejection of stage 2 offers (N=143)
offers below the producer’s outside option are rare (2.1%). Second stage offers with
an average offer of 8.9 were mostly accepted (85%), leaving W2 = 24.1 to the ac-
tor. The remaining 213 W1-offers with a mean of −6.6 were not accepted and the
round finished for these producer-actor-pairs immediately after stage one with both
parties receiving their outside option. Furthermore, at stage one negative offers are
almost never accepted (2%), and non-negative offers below the outside option are
rarely accepted (26%). Offers above the outside option were accepted in 97% of the
cases. Figure 3 presents a nonparametric estimate of the acceptance probability as
a function of first stage offers. The concave relationship in the range of [−4.5, 2]
might portend (if at all) heterogeneous risk preferences rather than risk neutrality
12
of actors.
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Figure 4: Acceptance probability of second stage offers
The nonparametric estimate of the acceptance probability at the second stage is
presented in Figure 4. Low dispersion of second stage offers, which additionally
were mostly accepted, explain the wide confidence bounds for offers below 7 and
almost constantly high acceptance rates around 90% for offers above 8.
After this general description of the results, we will now propose two different
behavioral approaches based on profit maximization and equity concerns and ad-
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dress the question how well those approaches explain the observed behavior in the
experiment.
6 Behavioral Approach
In this section we present two approaches to analyzing the data, one based on the
assumption of outcome maximizing decision makers and the other based on equity
concerns.
6.1 Outcome maximizing decision makers
Risk-Neutral Agents We first develop behavior in the game by assuming risk neu-
trality of procedures and actors. This solution serves as a benchmark. We solve this
game by backward induction. At the second stage, the actor makes a take it or leave
it-offer and offers the producer profits according to her outside option. Hence, the
wage at the second stage is
W∗2 = C2 −OP2 , (2)
Π2 = OP2 . (3)
At the first stage, the producer makes a take it or leave it offer to A that makes the
actor indifferent between accepting and rejecting the offer, so W∗1 + ωW
∗
2 = O
A
1 .
Therefore,
W∗1 = O
A
1 −ωW∗2 , (4)
Πs1 = C
s
1 −OA1 + ωW∗2 . (5)
Equations (2), (3), (4), and (5) together with the assumption that offers (not) worse
than the ones derived are (accepted) rejected represent the game-theoretic solution
of the game for risk neutral agents.
Relaxing Risk Neutrality: Risk-Averse Actors Now we partially relax the as-
sumption of risk neutrality by assuming that agents are risk-averse. Producers are
typically large studios owned by diversified investors. As the risk of movie suc-
cess or failure is idiosyncratic, producers can reasonably be assumed to behave as
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if they were risk-neutral whereas the same is not true for actors. Moreover, this
modelling strategy allows us to build in reservation wages that may vary across ac-
tors, and producers may not have full information about actors’ reservation wages
in bargaining. Hence, we introduce two assumptions:
• Actors are risk-averse, while producers are risk-neutral.
• Producers are uncertain about actors’ risk aversion.
We explore the implications of these assumptions for the game-theoretic solution
in turn. Denote the agent’s utility function by U and observe that there is no uncer-
tainty at the second stage of the game, hence equations (2) and (4) still represent the
solution to the second stage. Then we require:
U(OA1 ) ≤ ωU (W1 +W∗2 ) + (1−ω)U (W1) (6)
for any acceptable W1, where W∗2 is still given from (2). Then, define the lowest
W1 that is just acceptable to the agent by Ŵ1. Clearly, for any risk-averse agent Ŵ1
exceeds (4). Also, it follows directly from (6) that any wage offer W1 ≥ OA1 will be
accepted, even by an infinitely risk-averse agent. Hence, we have:
OA1 −ωW∗2 ≤ Ŵ1 ≤ OA1 . (7)
In case the agent’s utility function is common knowledge, we would now have
W∗1 = Ŵ1 as before. However, we assume now that Ŵ1 is unknown to the producer,
who believes that the actor’s reservation wage is drawn from a continuous distri-
bution F(Ŵ1) with density f (Ŵ1) and support given by (7). Hence, the producer’s
expected payoff as a function of her wage offer is:
E (Π (W1)) =
[
E (Cs1)−W1 + E(OP2 )
]
F (W1) + (1− F (W1))OP2
=
[
E(Cs1 +O
P
2 )−W1
]
F (W1) + (1− F (W1))OP2 (8)
where according to our model E
(
Cs1
)
= ω · Ch1 + (1−ω) · C f1 . Solving first order
conditions ∂E (Π (W1)) /∂W1 = 0 yields:17
W∗1 +
F (W∗1 )
f
(
W∗1
) = E (Cs1 +OP2 )−OP1 . (9)
17The second order condition for payoff maximization is f ′
(
W∗1
)
F
(
W∗1
)
> 2
(
f
(
W∗1
))2.
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We develop a parametric example in appendix B below, which allows us to ob-
tain a closed-form solution for (10) and then convert this solution into quantifiable
predictions.
Relaxing Risk Neutrality: Risk-Averse Actors and Producers The assumption
that producers are risk-neutral is, given the above mentioned reasons, very likely
to hold in reality. Nevertheless, the model will be investigated using a sample of
subjects who are randomly assigned to the roles of actors and producers. If we as-
sume risk preferences to be equally distributed over both sub-samples, we will also
observe risk-averse producers. As we do not pre-select producers in the experiment
according to their risk preferences, we relax the assumption of risk neutrality also
for producers.
The producer chooses W1 in order to maximize
ωF (W1)U(Ch1 +O
P
2 −W1)− (1−ω) F (W1)U(C f1 −W1) + (1− F (W1))U(OP2 )
(10)
A risk-neutral producer would offer at maximum W1 = OA1 , what even an in-
finitely risk-averse agent would accept. Independent of the risk aversion of the
producer, the minimum offer a risk-neutral actor might accept is W∗1 (from equation
(4)). Therefore, a producer offering W1 < OA1 − ωW∗2 could ensure rejection of the
contract by the actor. Such offers could come from risk averse producers who are
not willing to bear the risk of production. In appendix B we provide the intuition
for a risk aversion-threshold parameter.
As we are mainly interested in the case where the movie is produced, we do
not explicitly model risk aversion of producers. Relaxing the assumption of risk
neutrality for producers allows for self selection of participants either to become a
movie producer by offering within the range of equation (7) or to take the outside
option by offering a wage
W1 < OA1 −ωW∗2 . (11)
Hence, all offers below OA2 can be rationalized by game theory introducing also risk
aversion for producers. As in reality, we will only observe movies made by risk neu-
tral producers (or producers with a sufficient low risk aversion parameter). Equa-
16
tions (2), (3), and (7) represent the “game-theoretic” prediction (GT) of the game
allowing for risk-averse actors, whereas equation (11) captures the self-selection of
producers.
6.2 Decision making with Equality Concerns
Our second suggestion to solve the model is based on former results of ultima-
tum (bargaining) experiments, according to which one may expect that only claims
which aim at equal splits will be accepted.18
Equity theory (Homans, 1961) predicts equal sharing but leaves open what is
shared equally.19 This can, for instance, be the total of the expected pie E (C) =
E
(
Cs1 + C2
)
=
[
ω(Ch1 + C2) + (1−ω)C f1
]
. Sharing the expected stage pie sepa-
rately at each stage would result in W1 = E
(
Cs1
)
/2 for the first stage offer and
Π2 = C2/2 as second stage offer. However, there exists a range of possible first
stage offers within which compensation on the second stage and therefore equal
share of the total expected pie is still possible.20 We therefore allow, more generally,
W1 = E (Cs1) /2−ω∆ , (12)
Π2 = C2/2− ∆ , − C2/2 ≤ ∆ ≤ C2/2. (13)
In this respect, equation (13) essentially predicts (positive and negative) reci-
procity. Lower offers W1 are followed by lower offers Π2 such that Π2 depends pos-
itively on W1.21 Nevertheless, if both agents follow equity considerations, too mea-
ger offers, i.e., W1 < E
(
Cs1
)
/2− ωC2/2 and Π2 < C2/2− (1/ω)(E
(
Cs1
)
/2−W1),
will be rejected. Equations (12) and (13) represent the “equity-theoretic” prediction
(ET) of the game.22
18See Gu¨th (1995) and Roth (1995) for surveys.
19See Gu¨th (1988) for an attempt to add specificity to this concept.
20The actor will accept the lower offer and not be compensated with probability (1−ω). If the
producer offers E
(
Cs1
)
/2−ω∆ at the first stage in case of a hit the actor can offer C2/2−∆. To reach
the equal split he should be compensated by ∆.
21Equity theory would predict Π2 (W1) = C2/2− E
(
Cs1
)
/2ω +W1/ω.
22Other theoretical approaches allowing for other regarding preferences in final outcomes, con-
sider aversion against inequity (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or aversion against being above or below
the average income of bargaining parties (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) or concerns for the least well
in the society (Charness and Rabin, 2002).
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On the basis of table 2 we can distinguish between the predictions of the two the-
oretical approaches: (i) the game-theoretic solution allowing for risk-averse agents
(GT) with equations (2)-(5), (7), and (11), (ii) the equity-theoretic solution based on
the total expected profit (ET) with equations (12) - (13). Using the experimental
parameters above, we obtain the predictions in table 4.
Prediction Acronym Model Predictions
W1 Π2 W2
Game Theory GT [−10, 2.0] 7.0 26.0
GT (i) [−10,−4.5) − −
GT (ii) [−4.5, 2.0] 7.0 26.0
Equity Theory ET 4.75−ω∆ 16.5− ∆ 16.5+ ∆
with ∆ ∈ [−16.5, 26.5]
Table 4: Predictions of game theory allowing for risk averse agents (eqs. (2)-(3), (7), (11))
and equity theory (eqs. (12)-(13))
The game theoretic prediction can be subdivided in: (i) Self-selection of risk-averse producers. and (ii) Allowing
for risk-averse actors, assuming risk-neutral producers.
Clearly, given our calibrated parameters game theory and equity theory provide
quite different forecasts (see table 4). According to which W1 would lie either in
the interval of [−10, 2.0] or [−1.875, 8.875], respectively. Together, both approaches
cover 24% of the total action space [−10, 68], which can be decomposed in 15% for
GT, 14% for ET, and 5% for an overlapping range at [−1.875, 2].
At the second stage, there is no uncertainty about the joint profit of 33. Following
game theory, actors will offer the producer his outside option, Π2 = 7, resulting in
a wage–claim (W2) of 26. Whereas according to equity theory, actors would offer
Π2 = 16.5, or depending on the deviation from the equal split offer at stage one,
ω∆ with ω = 0.25, reducing his offer by a compensation of ∆. Where ∆ = 0 would
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imply that expected profits at each stage are shared equally.23
The implications of the bargaining model differ depending on the theoretical
approach applied.
(i) Predictions by game theory depend on the risk preferences of the actor as well
as how desperate the actor is to join the risky project given his outside oppor-
tunities.
(ii) Equity theory does not take the outside options of the agents into account and
concentrates only on the expected joint profit.24 It allows for deviations from
stage-wise equal split and predicts a certain relation of this deviation.
Hence, game theory requires knowledge of the real outside options of the actor
and the producer as well as the risk preferences of the actor.
We will later estimate actors’ risk parameters and producers’ uncertainty about
their bargaining partners’ risk preference using the experimental data. From the
observed experimental offers we also compute the stage-wise deviation from equal
split.
7 Contrasting Behavioral Predictions
The average first stage offer lies in the overlapping range of GT and ET, a fact which
seems to support both theories. Nevertheless, only higher offers with an average
of W1 = 4.5, ∆ = 1 (see table 3), which fall into the range of the equity prediction
(see table 4) were accepted. However, at the second stage, offers are close to the
game theoretic solution of 7. How well second stage offers match with the equity
prediction can be deduced from the deviation of an equal split of the expected joint
profit at stage one. Generally, second stage offers seem to be lower than ET would
23The range of ∆ is determined by the experimental design, i.e., the range in which decision vari-
ables of participants were allowed to lie. Since at the second stage, the highest possible offer could
be C2 = 33, ∆ could not be lower than −16.5. And since the lowest possible offer was −10, ∆ could
not be greater than 26.5.
24Equity theory does not take outside options into account as long as OA1 +O
P
1 ≤ E(C) and Oi1 ≤
E(C/2), for i ∈ {A, P}.
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predict: given from accepted first stage offers that ∆ = 1, one might expect second
stage offers to be around 15.5.
In the following, we investigate the predictive power of the two theories using
a nonparametric approach. For stage one, we estimate the probability of the obser-
vations to lie within one of the predicted intervals and determine the confidence
bounds of these probabilities.25 The probability estimates and their 95% confidence
bounds are reported in table 5. The estimates indicate the likelihood that W1 is of-
W1 (N = 648) P̂r cl cu
GT (N = 256) 39.0 35.2 42.7
GT(i) (N = 155) 23.9 20.4 27.2
GT(ii) (N = 101) 15.4 12.6 18.1
ET (N = 434) 67.0 63.4 70.6
ET & GT (N = 91) 14.0 11.4 16.7
Π2 (N = 143, mg=12) Sign test Ties p-value
GT : Π2 = 7 1 0 0.006
ET : ω = 0.25 2 0 0.043
Table 5: Probability estimates P̂r, 95% confidence bounds (cl and cu), and test statistics of
the Sign test (two-sided) based on matching group (mg) averages. (49 W1− offers lie outside
the range of GT and ET.))
fered within the predicted interval of GT to be 39%, whereas with 67% probability
the offer lies in the ET interval. The overlapping range of ET and GT comprises 14%
of all first stage offers.
25The probability that subject i’s wage offer (W1,i) lies in the theoretically predicted interval with
the lower bound bl and upper bound bu is estimated as P̂r = P̂r(W1,i ∈ [bl , bu]) = 1/N ∑Ni=1 1(W1,i ∈
[bl , bu]) with 1(·) denoting the indicator function. The confidence bounds are estimated as P̂r± 1.96 ∗√
P̂r(1− P̂r)/N.
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Second stage offers are compared to the prediction of GT and ET by a Sign test.26
We test ET by comparing the compensation ratio claimed by second stage offers to
its theoretically predicted value. The results of the test reported in table 5 indicate
that the GT hypothesis H0 : Π2 = 7 is rejected in favor for H1 : Π2 6= 7, (p = .006).27
Even though second stage offers are close to the GT prediction, they are mainly
slightly bigger. According to ET the offer at the second stage will be an equal split
of the second stage joint profit adjusted for the deviation of the first stage offer from
equal sharing of the expected joint profit. From equation (12) we know that this
deviation is: E
(
Cs1
)
/2−W1 = ω∆. The adjustment at the second stage will be equal
to the deviation at the second stage weighted by the probability to reach the second
stage: C2/2 − Π2 = ∆. If behavior is guided by equity principles, then the ratio
of stage-wise deviations from equity should be
(
E
(
Cs1
)
/2−W1
)
/ (C2/2−Π2) =
ω∆/∆ = ω. Figure 5 plots the density of this “deviation ratio” (ω̂) for all second
stage offers and additionally in a separate graph of the 123 cases satisfying ET at
the first stage. The median of the ratio density is with 21% close to the commonly
known probability (ω = 25%) of reaching the second stage. The density seems to
be skewed to lower ω-values indicating that actors might try to overcompensate
“losses” at the first stage in a self-serving way. This overcompensation is significant
(p = .043) but the difference of the deviation seems to be small, so that actors do not
earn significantly more than producers.28
We can summarize our results so far:
Result 1
(i) Producers frequently offer negative wages W1 which are almost never accepted;
W1−offers below the outside option of actors are rarely accepted which can
be explained by risk aversion of actors (but not by equity theory). This also
26The Sign test compares the number of positive and negative deviations from the hypothesized
median. For our data the test is appropriate as it does not require symmetry of the data under
consideration. The distribution of second stage offers is skewed to the left (see figure 2). To control for
individual dependencies, we will report results on the averages of (independent) matching groups.
27This result holds on the individual level at (p = .000).
28In only 3 out of 12 sessions average earnings of actors are higher than average earnings of pro-
ducers.
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Figure 5: Density estimate: Ratio of first and second stage deviations according to equity
theory
expresses that producers have to bear the risk of a flop alone or there is no
movie production.
(ii) At the first stage equity theory receives generally better support. This suggests
that unequal splits at the first stage are accepted if, in case of a success, the
actor is compensated according to forgone profits.
(iii) Equity concerns seem to be indicated less strongly by second stage offers. As
according to equity theory actors (over)compensate at the second stage for first
stage inequality by (too) low second stage offers.
(iv) Compared to other ultimatum game experiments, (accepted) second stage of-
fers are very low. Second stage proposals comprise on average 20% of the
surplus. Accepted proposals are with an average of 28% of the surplus also
surprisingly low.
Together, both theories can explain most observed first stage offers which por-
tends that the theories capture different behavioral rules which were applied in the
bargaining process. Further analysis of offers which fall in the predicted range of
GT (equation (7)) can help to shed light on individual risk aversion of actors and
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how producers take the uncertainty of unobserved heterogeneous risk preferences
of their bargaining partners into account. Additionally, as both approaches seem
to exhibit difficulties explaining behavior at the second stage, individual analysis
of the offer and acceptance behavior will expose the applied behavioral rules and
whether these can be rationalized in direction of equity or game theory. Therefore,
we only summarize results of an analysis and estimation of risk parameters as well
as of different individual reactions in stage two which can be found in the Appendix.
7.1 Risk Preferences
Producers Assuming risk-neutral producers and allowing for risk-averse actors,
GT(ii) can account for 15.4% of all first stage offers (see tables 4 and 5). Taking
the probability estimate of GT (allowing for risk aversion of all agents) of 39% into
account, approximately one-quarter of all first stage disagreements are caused by
producers’ risk preferences. In Section 2 (p. 16) we discussed the self-selection op-
portunity for producers: offers below W∗1 = −4.5 will never be accepted, a fact
which might be used by producers who do not want to get engaged in the risky
joint project. In fact, 50% of all producers never offer a wage below this threshold,
and 25% of all producers place only one third of their offers below W∗1 .
The following analysis of actors’ risk preferences and producers’ uncertainty
about their bargaining partner’s risk aversion takes only offers in the interval [−4.5, 2]
(equation (7)) into account, which can be rationalized and have a chance of being ac-
cepted according to GT.
Actors First we try to make inferences about actors’ risk aversion from rejected
and accepted offers. Here we assume that actors behave rational over all 18 periods
and infer individual risk preferences from their choices. However, for many sub-
jects in our experiment the results are not informative,29 leaving us with only 15 out
of 36 experimental subjects with usable results for estimating risk aversion. Esti-
29In total we excluded 21 subjects from the analysis for one of the following reasons: (1.) subjects
rejected offers of W1 = 2 and higher, which is inconsistent with any interpretation based on risk-
aversion, (2.) the highest offer rejected was smaller than the lower bound W = −4.5, (3.) the lowest
accepted offer was higher than the highest offer rejected.
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mating risk aversion ρ(Ŵ1) by the highest rejected offer we obtain individual risk
parameters in the range [.69, 7.13].30,31
Uncertainty about risk aversion We model producers’ uncertainty about actors’
risk aversion by choosing a parametric family of probability functions F(Ŵ) =(
Ŵ−W
W−W
)γ+1
with W = −4.5 and W = 2 in equation (9) above. We apply two ways to
estimate the parameter γ. Our first approach is directly using the arithmetic mean
of all offers in the range [−4.5, 2] . Our second approach also includes information
of answers to those offers and applies maximum likelihood estimation. Details are
explained in appendix C. The parameter estimate for γ is γ1 = 0.34 for approach 1
and γ2 = 2.70 for approach 2. This result suggests that producers seem to underesti-
mate actors’ risk aversion when making an offer since γ1 lies below γ2, the estimate
they would have had they known the answers to their offers, as well as below the
range of actors’ estimated individual risk preferences above.32
7.2 Reciprocity
In a second analysis of individual behavior we investigate the repeated response to
successful first stage offers. Despite the close resemblance of the data with equity
considerations at stage one, actors hardly seem to respond in a way that conforms to
the predictions of equity theory at the second stage. Regressing Π2 on W1 indicates
a constant second stage offer around 9 and no reaction towards the offer at the first
30We estimate risk aversion by stipulating that W0 = 20 (approximately equal to average experi-
mental earnings) and solve equation (19) in appendix B for Ŵ1.
31Another way to estimate risk preferences would be to assume that the acceptance threshold lies
in the middle of the interval of the highest rejected and the lowest accepted offer. For this case, we
can estimate Ŵ1 by averaging the highest rejected and the lowest accepted offer and we obtain a
larger range of risk parameters [.21, 26.17].
32Nevertheless, those findings should be interpreted cautiously as only 44% of the subjects in the
actor position could be used in the estimation of the risk aversion parameter. The decisions of all
remaining subjects were not informative because their highest rejected offer did not exceed their
lowest accepted offer. Also the estimation of the γ−parameter of the threshold density function
cannot account for all data. It considers only offers in the interval [−4.5, 2] which comprises only
15% of all first stage offers.
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stage.33 One possible explanation might be that actors react in heterogeneous ways.
We will now investigate how individual actors reciprocate. Second stage offers con-
ditional on first stage offers indicate three different types of behavior:
• constant offers, i.e., no reaction regardless of the first stage offer,
• reciprocity, reacting to high (low) first stage offers by a increase (decrease) of
second stage offers, and
• idiosyncratic reaction.
We separate those 34 actor-subjects for which the number of second stage expe-
riences ranges from 2 to 7 into three subgroups:34
• 6 participants of a constant type (with no variation of Π2) who all offer either
OP2 or the equal split (Opportunistic/Fair Proposers),
• 9 reciprocal participants (who respond in kind, i.e., react positively with Π2 to
W1) (Reciprocators), and
• 19 participants, who neither relied on the same Π2−offer nor reciprocated (in
the above sense) (Experimenters, who try out different offers Π2 in idiosyn-
cratic ways).
Four actors of the first type behave rather opportunistically after a hit by of-
fering producers essentially their outside option. The remaining 2 actors can be
regarded as equity minded with respect to the second stage joint profit with con-
stant Π2-offers of 16 and 14. Reciprocators respond to a low (high) wage offer at
the first stage by a lowering (increasing) their second stage offer. A linear regres-
sion
(
Πi2 = α0 + α1 ·W i1 + εi
)
for those participants results in α0 = 6.9 (0.2) , α1 =
0.41 (0.04) for the estimates with standard errors in parenthesis and R2 = 0.80.
33Estimation of Π2 on W1
(
Πi2 = α0 + α1 ·Wi1 + εi
)
results in αˆ0 = 9.3 (0.4) , αˆ1 = −0.09 (0.07) for
the parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses and R2 = 0.01.
34There is a total of 36 actors. Two participants could not be classified. One subject had only once
the chance to make an offer at the second stage. The other person received and offered the same
amounts in both cases.
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Nevertheless, this reaction is still different from ET, according to which parameter
estimates should be close to α0 = −2.5 , α1 = 4.0. Considering the regression results,
a corresponding compensation to a deviation of the first stage offer from equal split
seems to be dominated by the presence of the outside option of the producer also
for reciprocators.
The idiosyncratic behavior of actors can partly be explained by directional learn-
ing. Directional learning (see, for instance, Selten and Buchta, 1998) predicts the
direction of changing one’s strategy by adapting it in the direction suggested by an
ex-post-analysis of past choices in order to maximize profits. For an actor reaching
the second stage directional learning theory would predict that if his offer was re-
jected last time it will be increased next time. Similarly, in case of an accepted offer
last time one should not increase the offer (or keep it constant). 92% of all idiosyn-
cratic offers confirm directional learning.35
Result 2 An analysis of the data at an individual level sheds light on what we can
learn from the different approaches.
(i) Based on first stage offers which fall in the range of the GT, we model proposers’
beliefs about actors’ risk preferences. And based on responses to those of-
fers we estimated actors’ actual risk preferences. This analysis indicates that
producers overestimate actors’ risk preferences and therefore have to high ex-
pectations about the acceptance of low offers.
(ii) There is support for general reciprocation by some second stage offers in the
spirit of ET: 26% of actors reciprocate with their second stage offers and 6%
of all actors offered unconditionally the equal split. However, the majority of
actors (68%) adjust their offers in a profit maximizing manner.
35The reciprocity analysis should be interpreted cautiously as we observe between 2 and 7 second
stage responses per actor. Nevertheless, it shows, that the current theories are rather questionable in
a more complex environment.
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8 Summary
This paper has raised the question how bargaining processes evolve over time when
large risks are involved. We investigate this question in an explorative experimental
way. In order to capture risk involved in the field, we calibrate the experimental
parameters using data from a field study on the motion picture industry. In particu-
lar, we look at a two period bargaining model, with alternating bargaining position
and additive surplus at each stage. In terms of “ movie production,” the negotiation
arises between a producer and an actor about how to share the uncertain proceeds
from a first movie and in case of a sequel the profits of the second movie with alter-
nating bargaining positions.
The model developed here differs from the existing literature in two aspects.
First, the surplus at the first stage is stochastic and its realization revealed to both
bargaining parties only after establishing a contract. This differs from the existing
literature where at least one person is informed about the realization of the stochas-
tic surplus. Second, the surplus generated at each stage is additive and the bargain-
ing process can only continue if both parties accepted the contract in the previous
stage, resembling continuation projects in risky joint ventures.
Our results indicate that despite the riskiness of the business, even in the lab-
oratory there is “movie production” as some experimental participants in the role
of producers are willing to take on risks. Moreover, according to our data, produc-
ers either have to become the only risk taker or there is no movie production at all.
We analyze the data in light of two different behavioral approaches, one assum-
ing decision making is influenced by outcome maximization and individual risk
preferences, the other based on the decision makers’ goal to share equally. Look-
ing at the data from those two angles, we learn that often production of first films
fails since producers underestimate the risk aversion of actors, who seem not to be
willing to share the risk with the producer. Interestingly, we observe that at the
second stage with the sure surplus, accepted offers are much lower than conven-
tional studies on ultimatum bargaining report. This indicates that actors not only
offer lower shares to the producer, but also that this behavior is accepted by the pro-
ducer. Even though, actors in general behave rather opportunistically, reciprocity
27
ideas can partly explain other aspects of observed behavior, some actors reciprocate
to higher first stage offers by higher second stage offers or share the second stage
surplus equally.
Altogether there appears to be some variety in what motivates behavior in such
risky bargaining environments, which can neither be captured by assuming pure
outcome maximization of decision makers allowing for risk preferences nor by as-
suming that their choices are solely motivated by equity theory. It seems that differ-
ent motives are competing in such extreme environments. To which extend fairness
considerations survive or are crowded out and what drives the impact of different
motives in risky environments remain future research questions.
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9 Appendix
A Parameter Calibration
Calibrating Model Parameters. We estimate the profitability of sequels (in present
value terms) estimating NPVs on the basis of projected revenues and costs. Note
that the calculations are similar to those above, but for the first films we used ac-
tual data, whereas we use projected profitability for sequels based on the stylized
facts reported above. Hence, this procedure reflects the expected and not the actual
profitability of sequels. For example, it would never predict that a sequel is more
profitable than its first film (like Batman 2). Also, while no studio would ever make
a sequel with a negative NPV, sequels can turn out to make losses even after a suc-
cessful first film. (“Look who is Talking 2” was a disaster.) We can then estimate the
value of a sequel right, that is the economic value of the right of the movie studio
to produce a sequel after observing the success of the first film. While only a small
number of first film gives rise to profitable sequels, the movie studio does not have
to produce sequels to flops. Table 6 gives the relevant data.
Studio Profitable Sequels Value of sequel right Sequel/First film
MCA Universal 9 $6.69 30%
Paramount 3 $2.68 32%
Sony 4 $2.89 35%
20th Century Fox 2 $1.78 30%
Warner Brothers 3 $7.33 42%
Disney 5 $10.29 36%
Total/Average 26 $4.96 34%
Table 6: Values of Sequels
Hence, based on this model we would project that of 99 films, 26 would generate
profitable sequels. Note that even Sony, which had a negative profit for its first
films, would have expected positive profits for its sequels, since it would only make
sequels of 4 of its 34 films. These data are volatile and can be driven by a small
number of outliers. In the case of Sony, a large fraction of projected sequel profits
comes from the successful “Look who is talking,” that generates about 80% of its
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Parameter Symbol Value
Probability of hit ω 0.25
Profit of hit Πh1 66
Profit of flop Π f1 −12
Exp. profit of sequel Π2 20
Table 7: Parameters
projected sequel profits.36 For our purposes, we now define a “hit” as a film that
could give rise to a profitable sequel, hence our hit rate here would be 26/99 or
26.3%. Note that this hit rate probably overestimates the likelihood of a sequel being
made, since it includes some movies where the script of the first movie would hardly
give rise to a sequel (e.g., “Driving Miss Daisy”).
We reduce the empirical distribution of movies to a binary distribution as fol-
lows. A film in our model is either a “hit” and produces a payoff of Πh1, or a “flop”
with a payoff of Π f1 , where Π
h
1 > Π
f
1 . A film is a hit with probability ω, hence the
expected profitability of a film is:
µ = ωΠh1 + (1−ω)Π f1 . (14)
The standard deviation of the binary distribution is:
σ =
(
Πh1 −Π f1
)√
ω (1−ω) . (15)
The value of a sequel after a successful first film is denoted by Π2, hence the value
of the sequel right is ωΠ2. We chose the parameters in table 7.
Table 8 compares the actual values in the data, the calibrated values, and the
errors between actual and calibrated values. The calibration captures the mean and
standard deviation of the data very accurately. The profitability of the sequel and the
value of a sequel right is also captured. The typical ratio of the expected profitability
of a sequel to a successful first film is 30% for the model values, and 34.1% in the
sample.
36Two sequels to this film were made, but their economic success was far lower than expected on
the basis of the first film.
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Parameter Symbol Value Data Error
Prob. of hit ω 0.25 0.263 −4.8%
Expected profit µ $7.50m $7.44m 0.8%
Std. dev. σ $33.77m $34.16m −1.1%
Exp. prof. of sequel Π2 $20.00m $18.88m −5.6%
Sequel/first film Π2/Πh1 30% 34.1% 12.4%
Sequel right ωΠ2 $5.00m $4.96m −0.8%
Table 8: Error statistics
Calibrating Sequel Costs. With the calibrated parameters we adjust the values of
the experiment the following way: If the company produces the movie it earns the
revenue R and has to bear production costs, consisting of the actor’s wages W and
remaining production costs PC. The producer’s profits Π1 in the first stage for the
“hit” (Πh1) and for the “flop” (Π
f
1) as well as profit for a sequel Π2 can be written as:
Πki = R
k
i − (Wi + PCi) , for i = 1, k ∈ { f , h} , and i = 2 (without k). (16)
For calibrating R2 we use the stylized facts as in the case study for the relation of the
revenues of a successful film to a sequel, namely
R2 ≈ 710 R
h
1. (17)
Furthermore, we assume that the additional production costs are the same in the
film and its sequel, PC1 = PC2. With this system of equations and the calibrated
values of Πh1 = 66 (in case of a “hit”), of Π
f
1 = −12 (in case of a “flop”), and Π2 = 20
we chose the parameters according to the game with one modification as follows.
The field study does not give any evidence for W1 but indicates that the relation
of total wage costs to cumulative costs (so called “negative costs” plus distribution
expenses) is approximately one to five for a typical film, i.e., 14 PC1 > W1. That is
why we choose for the calibration of the first stage revenue W1 = OA1 = 2.
The actor and the producer negotiate about the remaining surplus, Cj = Πj1 +
OA1 = R
j
1 − PC1, j ∈ {l, h} before the movie is going to be produced. The two
possible pie sizes are therefore Ch1 = 68 and C
f
1 = −10 for the hit and the flop movie,
respectively. In case of a successful first movie the actor and producer negotiate
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Parameter Symbol Value
Profit: hit Πh1 66
Profit: flop Π f1 −12
Profit: sequel Π2 20
Revenue: hit Rh1 116
Revenue: flop R f1 38
Revenue: sequel R2 81
Additional costs hit/flop PC1 48
Additional costs sequel PC2 48
Wage costs hit/flop W1 2
Pie in case of a hit Ch1 68
Pie in case of a flop C f1 −10
Pie in case of the sequel C2 33
Outside option actor both stages OA 2
Outside option producer both stages OP 7
Table 9: Experimental parameters
about the remaining share of the sequel’s revenue which is C2 = R2− PC2 = 710 R1−
PC2 = 33, according to equation (17) and the assumption PC1 = PC2.
The outside option for the actor was chosen in order to resemble the outside
opportunity for the actor. It additionally separates from offers around “zero” as a
natural barrier between positive and negative offers at stage one. At the same time
the outside opportunity should not exceed the expected first stage profit nor the
equal split prediction described in Section 6. The producer’s outside option should
prevent from total bankruptcy but was chosen to be below the expected size of the
first stage pie.
As the outside options cannot be deduced from the empirical data, we had to
choose them from a reasonable range. To render bargaining at all profitable we had
to respect E(Cs1) > O
A
1 +O
P
1 and C2 > O
A
2 +O
P
2 where E (·) denotes the expectation
operator. In order to keep the whole game simple, both players’ outside options are
kept constant at both stages, i.e., OA1 = O
A
2 = 2 and O
P
1 = O
P
2 = 7. The action space
of offers was bound at first stage to the minimum and maximum joint profits, i.e.,
[−10, 68]. At the second stage we kept the lower bound constant and adjusted the
upper bound to the joint profit at the second stage, i.e, [−10, 33]. Table 9 displays all
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calibrated parameters.
B Parametric Example
Producers Assume producers have outside wealth Π0 and constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) with parameter ρ. Then
U (Π1) =
(Π0 + Π1)
1−ρ
1− ρ (18)
with Π1 = f (W1) . The risk aversion parameter for producers who do not want to
get engaged into the risky joint venture at all even when facing a risk neutral agent
who would accept W∗1 , have a risk aversion parameter ρ such that
U (W∗1 ) ≤ U
(
OP1
)
ω
(Π0 + Ch1 +O
P
2 −W∗1 )1−ρ
1− ρ − (1−ω)
(Π0 + C
f
1 −W∗1 )1−ρ
1− ρ ≤
(Π0 +OP1 )
1−ρ
1− ρ .
Actors Assume actors have outside wealth W0 and constant relative risk aver-
sion (CRRA) with parameter ρ. Then
U (W1) =
(W0 +W1)
1−ρ
1− ρ . (19)
This expression can be used directly in (6) and solved for Ŵ1 (at least numerically)
in terms of the parameters of the model.
Producers Define the lower and upper bound of the interval (7) by W and W
respectively:
WA1 −ω
(
C2 −OP2
)
, (20)
WA1 . (21)
Then choose the following parametric family of distribution functions:
F (W1) =
(
W1 −W
W −W
)γ+1
with γ ∈ [−1, ∞] , (22)
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which have density
f (W1) =
(γ + 1) (W1 −W)γ(
W −W)γ+1 (23)
so that the second order condition becomes
γ (W1 −W) > 2 (γ + 1) . (24)
Note that for γ (W1 −W) > 2 (γ + 1) this family of distribution functions is suf-
ficiently flexible for our example. For γ = −1 we obtain the uniform distribution,
for −1 < γ < 0 we obtain distribution functions with the probability mass shifted
to the left, and for γ > 0 we obtain distributions with the probability mass shifted
to the right. Substituting these into the example above and solving (9) gives:
W∗1 = min
{
W,
γ + 1
γ + 2
(
E
(
Cs1 +O
P
2
)
−OP1
)
+
1
γ + 2
W
}
. (25)
We have to guarantee that the solution lies in the interval (7), so the Min-operator
makes sure that the expression does not exceed the upper bound W. Hence, for
interior solutions W∗1 is a weighted average of the minimum W (the reservation
wage for a risk-neutral actor) and the producer’s maximum willingness to pay,
E
(
Cs1 +O
P
2
)−OP1 . Paying this amount would reduce the producer’s expected pay-
off to his outside option. The solution is intuitive. Observe that
∂W∗1
∂γ
=
E
(
Cs1 +O
P
2
)−OP1 −W
(γ + 2)2
> 2 (26)
for all solutions. Hence, a distribution that assigns higher probabilities to higher
reservation wages also leads to higher equilibrium wage offers. Note also that:
lim
γ→∞ W
∗
1 = min
{
W, E
(
Cs1 +O
P
2
)
−OP1
}
= W (27)
lim
γ→−1
W∗1 = W (28)
Here, the first result follows from the definition of (20) and (4). Hence, if we
choose γ small enough, then the probability distribution degenerates and all prob-
ability mass is put on the event where the actor is risk-neutral (W∗1 = W for all
γ + 1 < 0). Hence, for γ = −1 we recover the original problem and the solution
(4), (5). Conversely, for large γ, all actors are deemed to be infinitely risk averse and
judge the payoffs from the maximin criterion, so
Ŵ1 = OA1
(
W∗1 = W for γ + 1 >
W −W
E
(
Cs1 +O
P
2
)−OP1 −W
)
.
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Equation (25) extends our game theoretic solution to risk averse actors. Its im-
portance lies in the fact that we can always find a probability distribution charac-
terized by some parameter γ that would rationalize the behavior of producers as an
outcome of this game, where producers are uncertain about the actor’s reservation
utility. Conversely, offers outside the interval (7) cannot be rationalized at all.
C Modelling Uncertainty about Risk-Aversion
We model the uncertainty about actors’ risk aversion by choosing a parametric fam-
ily of probability functions F
(
Ŵ
)
=
(
Ŵ−W
W−W
)γ+1
in (9) in Section 2 (p. 14) above.
We apply two ways to estimate γ. Our first approach uses the arithmetic mean of all
offers in the range [−4.5, 2] . In appendix B we showed that (9) then becomes:
W∗1 = min
{
W,
γ + 1
γ + 2
(
E
(
Cs1 +O
P
2
)
−OP1
)
+
1
γ + 2
W
}
. (29)
We can calculate γ with the offers observed. For this, we insert the experimental
parameters and the mean offer in equation (29):
E
(
Cs1 +O
P
2
)
−OP1 =
17
4
WA1 −ω
(
C2 −OP2
)
= −9
2
Then equation (29) reads:
W∗1 = min
{
2,
γ + 1
γ + 2
(
17
4
)
+
1
γ + 2
(
−9
2
)}
. (30)
with γ as the only unknown parameter. The mean (median) offer in the range
[−4.5, 2] is 0.52 (0.00) and yields γ = 0.34 (0.06) from direct substitution into (29).
Our second approach to estimate γ is maximum likelihood estimation. We as-
sume that the first stage offer W1 is accepted (a = 1) when the threshold parameter
Ŵ is reached, i.e.,
a =
 1 if W1 ≥ Ŵ,0 if W1 < Ŵ.
hence, the probability of accepting W1 is
Pr (a = 1) = Pr
(
W1 ≥ Ŵ
)
= F (W1) .
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We assume that the unknown threshold parameter Ŵ follows the distribution
F
(
Ŵ
)
=
(
Ŵ−W
W−W
)γ+1
, with W = −4.5 and W = 2. The log-likelihood function
l (γ|W1) =
N
∑
i=1
(
ai · log
(
W1i −W
W −W
)γ+1
+ (1− ai) log
(
1−
(
W1i −W
W −W
)γ+1))
(31)
The log-likelihood function is maximized for γ = 2.7.37
D Instructions (Translation)
The experiment was conducted in German and the original experimental instructions were
also in German. This is a shortened38 translated version of the instructions. Participants
read the paper instructions before the computerized experiment started. In the beginning
of the instructions, subjects were informed that the instructions are the same for every par-
ticipant, they receive an initial endowment of DM 10, that the payoff is according to the
average earnings – wins and losses from all periods would be added, the exchange rate from
ECU (Experimental Currency Unit) to DM: ECU 1 = DM 2, that communication was not
allowed and questions would be answered privately and that all decisions will be treated
anonymously. Then the main instructions started. Before the programm started partici-
pants were informed that they will interact in this way 18 periods and that their bargaining
partner is randomly selected after each period.
Two parties, two persons A and B negotiate in each period about how to share
up to two amounts of money (all in ECU). Whether you act as A or B is determined
randomly at the beginning of the experiment. You will keep your role for the whole
experiment. The schedule of the decision making is as follows:
First B offers an amount v1 , with −10 ≤ v1 ≤ 68, to participant A of a later
randomly determined amount G1. Participant A decided whether he accepts or
rejects offer v1 of B.
⇒ In case of rejection you receive:
as A : 2 and
37The likelihood function is L (γ |W11...W1N ) = ∏i=Ni=1 F (W1i)ai (1− F (W1i))1−ai . Substituting for
F(Ŵ) and taking logs gives (31).
38The complete German instructions are available at request.
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as B : 7.
The interaction is finished.
⇒ In case of acceptance you receive:
as A : v1
as B : G1 − v1
If A accepted the offer v1 the amount G1 which is to be shared is determined
randomly. Thereby with a probability of 75% the amount has the value of −10 and
with probability 25% the value of 68. Please note, that G1 = −10 causes a loss for
player B.
If G1 = −10 the interaction is finished.
Otherwise (after G1 = 68) the interaction proceeds and A offers B a share v2 ,
with −10 ≤ v2 ≤ 33, about an additional amount G2 of 33. Participant B decides
whether he accepts or rejects the offer v2 of A.
⇒ In case of rejection you receive additionally to the previous profit:
as A : 2 and
as B : 7.
The interaction is finished.
⇒ In case of acceptance you receive additionally to the previous profit:
as A : G2 − v2 (= 33− v2)
as B : v2
The interaction is finished.
At the end you will be informed again about the decisions of your interaction
partner and your corresponding payoffs. Please note, that losses are possible.
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